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ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS: 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
Jan Wouters, Eva Brems, Stefaan Smis and Pierre Schmitt
I. BACKGROUND
On 16–17 March 2007, an international conference on the theme of the present 
volume was organised in Brussels to mark the fi rst issue of the journal Human 
Rights & International Legal Discourse. A selection of contributions presented at 
the conference has been published in the journal1, while other papers including 
the keynotes have been adapted and are included in the present book, in addition 
to new contributions. Th e further conceptualisation of this book, the painstaking 
editing process, the collection of additional contributions, the updating of many 
chapters in liaison with the authors and the writing of a number of additional 
chapters, including the present editorial introduction, took place as part of an 
ongoing inter-university project between the Universities of Leuven (Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven), Brussels (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) and Ghent (Universiteit 
Gent) funded by the Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek – Vlaanderen. We are 
grateful to the Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek – Vlaanderen, the Vlaamse 
Interuniversitaire Raad – University Development Cooperation, the Cabinet of 
the Minister of Foreign Aff airs of Belgium, the Royal Flemish Academy of 
Belgium for Sciences and Arts, the Minister of External Relations of the Brussels 
Capital Region, and our universities for their support.
II. AIM OF THE BOOK
Th e present book is designed to explore the mechanisms through which 
accountability can be realised for violations of human rights committed by, or 
attributable to, international organisations and their  staff . Th e subject is at the 
1 See 1 Human Rights & International Legal Discourse 2 (2007) pp. 211–441.
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intersection between human rights law,  public international law and the law of 
international organisations. It profoundly aff ects some of the basic tenets and 
doctrines of the latter legal arena.
Some may consider the theme of the book far-fetched. How could one imagine 
international organisations violating human rights? Have they not been set up by 
their Member States with the purpose of contributing to the provision of global 
or regional public goods and does this not imply that they generally protect and 
promote, rather than violate, human rights? Some international organisations 
and bodies have even specifi cally been established to protect and promote human 
rights. One may think of regional human rights courts with great achievements, 
such as the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, and of the plurality of bodies, committees and offi  ces set up in 
the framework of the United Nations (UN), from the UN Human Rights Council 
to the treaty bodies that monitor the respect for the global human rights treaties 
and the Offi  ce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Th e UN itself is a 
prominent example of an international organisation which, from its inception in 
1945, not only ‘reaffi  rm[ed] faith in fundamental human rights’2 but has as one 
of its primary objectives ‘promoting and encouraging respect for human rights 
and for fundamental freedoms for all’3, including promoting such respect and 
observance of human rights at a universal level.4 Many other international 
organisations, particularly also regional ones (e.g. the  European Union (EU), the 
African Union (AU) and the  Organization of American States ( OAS)), include 
human rights protection among their primary or accessory goals.
One should note that international organisations have proliferated enormously 
(currently their number is well over 500)5 and over the years they have unfolded 
an unprecedented scope and intensity of activities in a wide range of policy fi elds. 
Th is expansion may be explained by the need for collective action to face global 
and regional problems: international organisations provide a means to 
institutionalise inter-State cooperation.6 International organisations are 
frequently intervening in peace-keeping operations and military action. Th ey 
sometimes even exercise administrative powers over territories. Many of them are 
heavily involved in international policy-making and/or standard-setting. Together 
2 Th ird recital of the preamble of the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter).
3 Art. 1(3) UN Charter; see also Art. 13(1)(a) (General Assembly), Art. 62(2) (ECOSOC), 
Art. 76(c) (trusteeship system).
4 Art. 55(c) UN Charter.
5 C.F. Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations, 2nd edn. 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1996) p. 6.
6 J.-M. Coicaud, ‘International organisations, the evolution of international politics, and 
legitimacy’, in J.-M. Coicaud and V. Heiskanen, eds., Th e Legitimacy of International 
Organisations (Tokyo/New York/Paris, United Nations University Press 2001) p. 545.
Introductory Remarks
Intersentia 3
with an increasing impact of the activities of international organisations on the 
lives of people around the world, inevitably situations multiply in which human 
rights (political, civil, but also economic, cultural and social) may be threatened 
or violated through the actions, operations or policies of such organisations.
Since international organisations exercise important aspects of public authority 
and even act as substitute for States in some instances, an effi  cient accountability 
system has to be created in order to review the decisions made and to sanction 
any misconduct, similarly to the checks and balances established to control 
democratic governments. As observed by Th omas Hammarberg, the  Council of 
Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘an international accountability 
defi cit is no good for anyone, least of all the local population. No one, especially 
an international organisation, is above the law.’7
Th e theme of responsibility of international organisations has progressively 
gained the attention of legal scholars8 and international bodies in the past two 
decades. Especially the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) and of 
the International Law Association (ILA) should be mentioned in this respect.
Th e ILC decided to include the topic in its work programme in 2000.9 Two years 
later, it established a Working Group and appointed a Special Rapporteur, 
7 T. Hammarberg, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘International 
Organisations acting as quasi-governments should be held accountable’, 8 June 2009, also 
available at the Commissioner’s website at www.commissioner.coe.int.
8 See inter alia, H.G. Schermers, ‘Liability of International organisations’, Leiden Journal of 
International Law (1988) pp. 3–14; P. Klein, La responsabilité des organisations internationales 
dans les ordres juridiques internes et en droit des gens (Bruxelles, Bruylant 1998); R. Higgins, 
‘Th e Responsibility of States Members for the Defaults of International Organizations: 
Continuing the Dialogue’, in S. Schlemmer-Schulte and K.-Y. Tunk, eds., Liber Amicorum 
I.F.I. Shihata. International Finance and Development Law (Th e Hague/London/Boston/New 
York, Kluwer Law International 2001) pp. 441–448; A. Reinisch, ‘Governance without 
Accountability?’, German Yearbook of International Law (2001) pp. 270–306; A. Reinisch, 
‘Securing the Accountability of International Organisations’, 7 Global Governance (2001) pp. 
131–149; I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, ‘Liability of Member States for Acts or Omissions of an 
International Organization’, in S. Schlemmer-Schulte and K.-Y. Tunk, eds., op. cit. in this 
note, pp. 727–739; K. Wellens, Remedies against International Organisations (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 2002); K. Wellens, ‘Accountability of International organisations: 
Some Salient Features’, 97 American Society of International Law Proceedings (2003) pp. 
241–245; K. Wellens, W.E. Holder and G. Hafner, ‘Can International organisations be 
controlled? Accountability and Responsibility’, 97 American Society of International Law 
Proceedings (2003) pp. 236–240; K. Wellens, ‘Fragmentation of International Law and 
Establishing an Accountability Regime for International organisations: Th e Role of the 
Judiciary in Closing Th e Gap’, 25(4) Michigan Journal of International Law (2004) pp. 
1159–1181; S. Yee, ‘Th e Responsibility of States Member of an International Organisation for 
its Conduct as a Result of Membership or Th eir Normal Conduct Associated with 
Membership’, in M. Ragazzi, ed., International Responsibility Today. Essays in Memory of 
Oscar Schachter (Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers 2005) pp. 436–454.
9 ILC, Report of its fi ft y-second session, 1 May to 9 June and 10 July to 18 August 2000, UN Doc. 
A/55/10, pp. 135 et seq.
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Professor Giorgio Gaja.10 From its fi ft y-fi ft h (2003) to its sixty-fi rst (2009) 
sessions, the ILC has received seven reports11 from the Special Rapporteur and 
provisionally adopted draft  articles 1 to 66.12 According to draft  article 3, ‘[e]very 
internationally  wrongful act of an international organization entails the 
international responsibility of the international organization.’ Draft  article 4 
provides that ‘[t]here is an internationally  wrongful act of an international 
organization when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) [i]s attributable 
to the international organization under international law; and (b) [c]onstitutes a 
breach of an  international obligation of that international organization.’ Th e 
ongoing process of ILC work has permitted one to take into consideration the 
comments made by States and international organisations on the draft  articles 
provisionally adopted by the ILC and to consequently make amendments thereto. 
For instance, in the 2006 report, draft  article 28(1) went as follows: ‘[a] State 
member of an international organisation incurs international responsibility if it 
circumvents one of its international obligations by providing the organization 
with  competence in relation to that obligation, and the organization commits an 
act that, if committed by that State, would have constituted a breach of that 
obligation.’13 In 2009, the ILC substantially modifi ed the provision and proposed 
draft  article 60(1), which no longer links State responsibility to the conferral of 
powers to an international organisation:
‘A State member of an international organization incurs international responsibility if 
it seeks to avoid complying with one of its own international obligations by taking 
advantage of the fact that the organization has  competence in relation to the subject 
matter of that obligation, thereby prompting the organization to commit an act that, if 
committed by the State, would have constituted a breach of the obligation.’14
Partly prior to and parallel with the work of the ILC on the responsibility of 
international organisations, another important attempt in this area was made by 
the ILA. It established a specifi c Committee in 1996 to study the accountability of 
international organisations. Th e ILA Committee took a broader approach than the 
one taken by the ILC. Whereas the ILC only focuses on the responsibility towards 
Member and Non-Member States15, the ‘recommended rules and practices’ of the 
10 ILC, Report of its fi ft y-fourth session, 29 April to 7 June and 22 July to 16 August 2002, UN 
Doc. A/57/10, pp. 228 et seq.
11 See http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/guide/9_11.htm.
12 ILC, Report of the sixty-fi rst session 4 May to 5 June and 6 July to 7 August 2009, UN Doc. 
A/64/10, chapter IV, paras. 31–51.
13 See, with commentary, ILC, Report of the Fift y-eighth session, 1 May to 9 June and 3 July to 
11 August 2006, UN Doc. A/61/10, p. 283.
14 ILC, Report of the sixty-fi rst session, 4 May to 5 June and 6 July to 7 August 2009, UN Doc. 
A/64/10, p. 38.
15 ILC, Report of its fi ft y-fourth session, 29 April to 7 June and 22 July to 16 August 2002, UN 
Doc. A/57/10, p. 229.
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ILA Committee cover the accountability of an international organisation towards 
their members and  third parties16, i.e. ‘victims or wrongdoers who are not 
members of the [international organisation] concerned: states, other [international 
organisation]s,  individuals or legal persons, including private entities’.17 Moreover, 
the ILA Committee focused on the ‘accountability of international organisations’, 
which is a broader concept than their responsibility. According to the fi nal report 
of the ILA Committee published in 2004, ‘[a]ccountability of [international 
organisation]s is a multifaceted phenomenon. Th e form under which accountability 
will arise will be determined by the particular circumstances surrounding the acts 
or omissions of an [international organisation], its member States or  third parties. 
Th ese forms may be legal, political, administrative or fi nancial. A combination of 
the four forms provides the best chances of achieving the necessary degree of 
accountability.’18 Th e concept of accountability is thoroughly analysed by Ige F. 
Dekker in Chapter 2 of this book.
III. CONTENTIOUS LEGAL ISSUES
A. ARE INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS BOUND BY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS?
As a preliminary to the analysis of the accountability of an international 
organisation for human rights violations, the binding character of international 
human rights law has to be assessed in regard to international organisations, 
which – with one exception for the EU19 – are not bound as signatories by any 
 human rights treaty.20
16 ILA, Report of the seventy-fi rst conference, Berlin 2004 (London, International Law Association 
2004), p. 4.
17 Ibid., p. 20.
18 ILA, Report of the seventy-fi rst conference, Berlin 2004 (London, International Law Association 
2004), p. 5. Footnotes omitted.
19 Reference is made to the UN Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities, to which 
the EU (prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon: the EC) is a signatory. It should 
also be noted that the Treaty of Lisbon (Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, Lisbon, 13 December 2007, O.J. 
C 306 (17 December 2007); consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as they are amended by 
the Lisbon Treaty are published in O.J. C 85 (30 March 2010)) empowers the EU to accede to 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: 
Art. 6(2) Treaty on European Union. Accession by the EU has become possible from the point 
of view of the Council of Europe now that Protocol No 14 (Protocol No. 14 to the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, amending the control 
system of the Convention, done at Strasbourg 14 May 2004 (CETS No. 194, entered into force 
on 1 June 2010) inserts Art. 59(2) into the Convention, enabling the EU to accede to the latter.
20 A. Reinisch, ‘Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the 
Security Council for the Imposition of Economic Sanctions’, 95(4) American Journal of 
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Indeed, the international human rights legal framework is generally designed for 
States. But does this mean that international organisations are not bound by any 
international human rights norms? Th is question necessitates, in the fi rst place, a 
query into the international  legal personality of the international organisation at 
hand21 and the legal consequences fl owing from its status as a subject of 
international law.22 If their independent personality is recognised, international 
organisations will be held internationally responsible for their acts in case of a 
violation of an applicable international norm.23
Th e aforementioned question also begs another fundamental issue, namely the 
extent to which international human rights norms not only belong to established 
rules of treaty law, but also form part of  customary international law and/or 
general principles of international law.24 Although there seems to be a convergence 
of views on the obligation of international organisations to respect at least some 
human rights25, controversies persist, notably as to the identifi cation of sources of 
this obligation and its scope. For several authors, this obligation rests on the 
customary status of international human rights. Th e massive adoption and 
continuous affi  rmation of the fundamental human rights listed in the  Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights ( UDHR)26 have, so it is submitted, transformed 
these rules – or at least some of them – into  customary international law.27 As 
International Law (2001) p. 854; A. Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press 2006) p. 91.
21 ICJ,  Reparation for Injuries Suff ered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 
ICJ Rep. (1949) pp. 173–219. Th e international legal personality of international organisations 
has given rise to heated debates among scholars. See notably J. Klabbers, An Introduction to 
International Institutional Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2009) pp. 46–52; 
N.D. White, Th e law of international organisations, 2nd edn. (Manchester, Manchester 
University Press 2005), pp. 30–70. Nigel D. White notably examines international 
organisations which have no international legal personality, such as the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
22 ICJ,  Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1991 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Rep. (1980) p. 73.
23 Apart from the ongoing work of the ILC in this area and the fi nal report published by the ILA 
in 2004, op. cit. n. 16, see the references mentioned supra in footnote 8.
24 See O. De Schutter, Chapter 4.
25 T. Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press 1989) pp. 94–96; H. Hannum, ‘Th e Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
in National and International Law’, 25 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 
(1995–1996) pp. 287–395; C. Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism Actors 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press 2003) p. 4; T. Ahmed and I. de Jesús Butler, ‘Th e European 
Union and Human Rights: an International Legal Perspective’, 17(4) European Journal of 
International Law (2006) pp. 771–801; J. Wouters and C. Ryngaert, ‘Impact on the Process of 
the Formation of Customary International Law’, in M.T. Kamminga and M. Scheinin, eds., 
Th e Impact of Human Rights Law on General International Law (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press 2008) pp. 111–131.
26 UN General Assembly, Resolution A/217 (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN 
Doc. A/RES/3/217 A, 10 December 1948.
27 See notably H. Hannun, loc. cit. n. 25, at p. 322; C. Tomuschat, op. cit. n. 25, at p. 4.
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 customary international law applies to all subjects of international law, it is clear 
that such customary human rights norms are also binding upon international 
organisations.28 Other authors consider that human rights have become general 
principles of international law through the medium of the ‘general principles of 
law recognized by civilized nations’ mentioned in Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice.29 Such general principles would not require 
State practice bur rather result from ‘a variety of ways in which moral and 
humanitarian considerations fi nd a more direct and spontaneous “expression in 
legal form”.’30 Moreover, some provisions of human rights law – such as the 
prohibition of racial  discrimination – are considered as norms of  jus cogens.31 It is 
generally admitted that peremptory rules bind international organisations.32
Nevertheless, if obligations there are, their scope and content need to be clarifi ed. 
In addition to the obligation to respect human rights, the question must be raised 
whether international organisations with no specifi c  mandate in the area of 
human rights bear an obligation to protect, report on or monitor human rights. 
Th is question has been fi ercely debated in relation to international development 
actors, such as the international fi nancial institutions ( IFIs) or the United 
Nations Development Program ( UNDP). Let us take a closer look at these bodies 
in order to better gauge the debate and its sensitivities.
Human Rights are not mentioned in the Articles of Agreement of the 
 International Monetary Fund ( IMF), of the  International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development ( IBRD) and the  International Development Association (IDA). 
At the  IMF, this has been interpreted as indicating that the organisation has no 
 mandate to promote human rights.33 At the  World Bank, former General 
28 H.G. Schermers, ‘Th e Legal Bases of International Organization Action’, in R.-J. Dupuy, ed., 
Manuel sur les organisations internationales – A Handbook on International Organizations 
(Dordrecht/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers 1998) p. 402; C. Tomuschat, 
‘International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century: General 
Course on Public International Law’, 281 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit 
International (2001) pp. 134–135.
29 See B. Simma and P. Alston, ‘Th e Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and 
General Principles’, 12 Australian Yearbook of International Law (1988–1989) p. 82, at pp. 
102–108.
30 Ibid., at p. 105.
31 B. Kondoch, ‘Human Rights Law and UN Peace Operations in Post-Confl ict Situations’, in 
N.D. White and D. Klaasen, eds., Th e UN, Human Rights and Post-Confl ict Situations, 
(Manchester, Manchester University Press 2005) p. 36.
32 H.G. Schermers, loc. cit. n. 28, at p. 402.
33 G.B. Taplin, ‘Speaking Points: Globalization and its Impacts on the Full Enjoyment of Human 
Rights’, Speech to Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 
8 August 2001, available at www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/7A33AABB095C5
1F3C1256AA300282C86; see also G. Capdevila, ‘IMF Not Taking into Account Human 
Rights Issues’, 13 August 2001, available at www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/
article/209/42944.html. Internet pages last visited on 3 March 2010.
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Counsel R. Dañino acknowledged that ‘human rights and international human 
rights law have become increasingly relevant to helping the Bank achieve its 
mission and fulfi l its purposes’ and that ‘it is now evident that human rights are 
an intrinsic part of the Bank’s mission.’ Yet, he added that the role of the Bank 
(and by extension, the Fund) ‘is not that of an enforcer of human rights 
obligations.’ Indeed,  enforcement ‘is primarily the responsibility of member 
countries and of other, non-fi nancial entities, such as the United Nations treaty 
monitoring bodies and regional human rights organizations.’34
Th e relationship between  IFIs and human rights has been discussed at length by 
scholars.35 Some authors suggest that international fi nancial institutions should 
have with respect to human rights generally a ‘ duty of vigilance’ to ensure that 
their actions have no negative eff ects on the human rights situation in their 
borrowing members.36 Others go further and consider that the  IFIs’ substantial 
infl uence over borrowing countries make it ‘increasingly untenable that the  IFIs 
should function without human rights responsibilities within their spheres of 
infl uence, and without accountability for the impact of their economic decisions 
on the exercise of human rights.’37
34 R. Dañino, ‘Legal Opinion on Human Rights and the Work of the World Bank by the Senior 
Vice-President and General Counsel’, 27 January 2006, available at www.ifi watchnet.org/
sites/ifi watchnet.org/fi les/DaninoLegalOpinion0106.pdf.
35 See inter alia D.D. Bradlow, ‘Th e World Bank, the IMF, and human rights’, Transnational Law 
& Contemporary Problems (1996) pp. 47–90; J.A. Fox and C.D. Brown, eds., Th e Struggle for 
Accountability, Th e World Bank, NGOs and Grassroots Movements (Cambridge, MIT Press 
1998); D.L. Clark, ‘Th e World Bank and Human Rights: Th e Need for Greater Accountability’, 
15 Harvard Human Rights Journal (2002) pp. 205–226; S.I. Skogly, Th e Human Rights Obligations 
of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (London, Cavendish 2001); M. Darrow, 
Between Light and Shadow: the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and International 
Human Rights Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2003); W. van Genugten, P. Hunt and S. Mathews, 
eds., World Bank, IMF and Human Rights (Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers 2003); B. Carin and 
A. Wood, eds., Accountability of the International Monetary Fund (Ottawa, Ashgate and the 
International Development Research Centre 2005); B. Ghazi, Th e IMF, the World Bank Group 
and the Question of Human Rights (Ardsley, Transnational 2005); K. De Feyter, ‘Th e 
International Financial Institutions and Human Rights: Law and Practice’, in F. Gómez and K. 
De Feyter, eds., International Protection of Human Rights: Achievements and Challenges (Bilbao, 
University of Deusto 2006) pp. 561–592; R. Dañino, ‘Th e Legal Aspects of the World Bank’s 
Work on Human Rights: Some Preliminary Th oughts’, in A. Palacio, C. Sage and S. Woolcock, 
eds., Th e World Bank Legal Review: Law, Equity and Development, vol. 2 (Leiden/Boston, 
Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers 2006) pp. 295–324; D. Kinley, ‘Human Rights and the World Bank: 
Practice, Politics and Law’, in A. Palacio, C. Sage and S. Woolcock, eds., Th e World Bank Legal 
Review: Law, Equity and Development, vol. 2 (Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers 2006) 
pp. 353–383; L. Boisson de Chazournes, ‘Th e Bretton Woods Institutions and Human Rights: 
Converging Tendencies’, in W. Benedek, K. De Feyter and F. Marella, eds., Economic 
Globalisation and Human Rights (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2007) pp. 210–263.
36 P. Klein, ‘La responsabilité des organisations fi nancières internationales et les droits de la 
personne’, Revue Belge de Droit International (1999) p. 97.
37 M.E. Salomon, ‘International Economic Governance and Human rights Accountability’, in 
M.E. Salomon, A. Tostensen and W. Vandenhole, eds., Casting the Net Wider: Human rights, 
Development and New Duty-Bearers (Antwerp, Intersentia 2007) p. 27.
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In a recent study on the impact of structural adjustment programmes on human 
rights in 131 developing countries between 1981 and 2003, R. Abouharb and D. 
Cingranelli concluded that ‘equitable economic development eff orts would be 
more effi  cient and many of the negative impacts of  World Bank and  IMF loans 
and grants would be mitigated or eliminated if the  IFIs pursued a human-rights 
based strategy of development assistance.’38 Despite this external pressure, the 
 IFIs maintain their suspicion towards human rights and show reluctance to 
integrate them in their operations.39
Another important development actor is the  UNDP, which works with 166 
countries in order to achieve progress in development. At the UN World Summit 
of 2005, heads of government recognised that peace and security, development and 
human rights are the three interlinked and mutually reinforcing pillars of the UN 
system.40 Despite this consensus, the relationship between human rights and 
development has been subject to disagreement between UN Member States. 
Indeed, both within the  General Assembly Triennial Comprehensive Policy 
Review (TCPR) process and the  General Assembly’s System-wide Coherence 
(SWC) process, Member States diverged on the place of human rights in UN 
development activities. Th e G-77 and China expressed their concern about the 
inordinate emphasis given to human rights in UN development activities. Th e 
Group feared a  discrimination against developing countries if human rights were 
to be considered as UN development objectives. Human rights ‘could be misused 
to introduce new conditionalities on international development assistance. Th is is 
not acceptable to the developing countries.’41 Similar arguments were raised within 
the  UNDP Executive Board discussions on the  UNDP strategic plan 2008–2011. 
Th e fi nal strategic plan states that ‘while  UNDP should uphold universal United 
38 R. Abouharb and D. Cingranelli, Human Rights and Structural Adjustment (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 2008) p. 13.
39 G.A. Sarfaty considers that human rights are a marginal issue at the World Bank because of 
the organisational culture of the latter. ‘Human rights are a particularly diffi  cult set of norms 
to incorporate into an economic institution because doing so forces employees into a struggle 
between principles and pragmatism – that is, it creates a tension between normative, 
intangible values and goals, and practical ways to solve problems (which may make it 
necessary to reconcile competing principles). In an environment like the Bank where most 
issues are subject to cost-benefi t analysis, employees may be ambivalent about principles that 
appear to be non-negotiable or subject to trade-off s. Th ey may perceive potential costs in 
trying to render seemingly incommensurable values commensurate.’ G.A. Sarfaty, ‘Why 
Culture Matters in International Institutions: Th e Marginality of Human Rights at the World 
Bank’, 103 American Journal of International Law (2009) pp. 647–683.
40 UN General Assembly, ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’, UN Doc. A/Res. 60/1 (2005), paras 9 
and 72; see also UN General Assembly, ‘Human Rights Council’, UN Doc. A/Res. 60/251 
(2006), sixth recital; UN General Assembly, ‘Th e Role of the United Nations in Promoting a 
New Global Human Order’, UN Doc. A/Res. 62/213 (2008), second recital.
41 M. Akram, Statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China at the operational activities 
segment of the 2007 substantive session of the ECOSOC, 12 July 2007, available at www.g77.
org/statement/getstatement.php?id=070712.
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Nations norms and standards, including those related to human rights,  UNDP 
does not have any normative or monitoring role with regard to human rights.’42 
Yet, the terms ‘normative’ or ‘monitoring role’ have not been defi ned in the plan.43
B. ACCOUNTABILITY OF MEMBER STATES OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
Next to the accountability of international organisations themselves, the question 
arises whether Member States are or remain accountable for violations of human 
rights attributed to the international organisation of which they are a member. If 
one recognises that international organisations are bound by international human 
rights norms, the accountability for acts of the international organisation relies 
exclusively on the international organisation itself, and not on its Member States. 
However, it can be argued that a ‘piercing of the veil’ is or should be possible44, 
since it would prevent Member States from evading their obligations in acting 
through the international organisation.45 Such piercing of the veil would permit 
either holding top offi  cials and/or collaborators of the organisations personally 
liable for human rights violations, and/or reaching (some of) the Member States 
that are behind the decisions in question that result in human rights violations.
Th e evasion by Member States of their obligations by acting (in one way or 
another) through international organisations constitutes an abuse of the  legal 
personality of an international organisation. Moreover, situations can and do 
occur where Member States take advantage of their prerogatives as laid down in 
the constitutional act of the international organisation. If violations of human 
rights result from such behaviour of a Member State (or a number of Member 
States) that – based on its (or their) prerogatives in the  decision-making process 
of the international organisation at hand (for example the veto right within the 
 Security Council) – forces through a decision, should there not at least be the 
possibility for a concurrent accountability of this (these) Member State(s)?46
42 Executive Board of the UNDP and the United Nations Population Fund, ‘ UNDP Strategic 
Plan 2008–2011, Accelerating Global Progress on Human Development’, UN Doc. 
DP/2007/43/Rev.1, 22 May 2008.
43 For a comprehensive analysis of the relation between human rights and UNDP, see M. Darrow 
and L. Arbour, ‘Th e Pillar of Glass: Human Rights in the Development Operations of the 
United Nations’, 103 American Journal of International Law (2009) pp. 446–501.
44 C. Brölmann, Th e Institutional Veil in Public International Law. International Organisations 
and the Law of Treaties (Amsterdam, Oxford, Hart Publishing 2007) pp. 262–267.
45 M. Hirsch, Th e Responsibility of International Organizations Toward Th ird Parties: Some Basic 
Principles (Dordrecht-Boston-London, Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers 1995) p. 170.
46 See J. d’Aspremont, ‘Th e Limits of the exclusive responsibility of international organizations’, 
1(2) Human Rights & International Legal Discourse (2007) pp. 217–229; J. d’Aspremont, ‘Abuse 
of the Legal Personality of International organisations and the Responsibility of Member 
States’, International Organisations Law Review (2007) pp. 91–119.
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A way of ensuring that Member States do not evade their obligations by acting 
through international organisations would be to consider that international 
organisations are bound by the treaties that bind their Member States. Frederik 
Naert thoroughly analyses this question in chapter 5 of this book.47 Moreover, 
the ILC has integrated the topic of Member States seeking to avoid compliance in 
its draft  article 60, provisionally adopted in 2009 and mentioned supra, II.48
C. OBSTACLES TO ACCOUNTABILITY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
Even if recognised in principle, accountability of international organisations for 
human rights violations faces diffi  cult obstacles in practice. Th ere is no 
international court that generally has jurisdiction over international 
organisations. Moreover,  national courts may not adjudicate claims against 
international organisations because of the  immunity traditionally granted to 
them.49 As a consequence, one is almost completely dependent on the goodwill 
of an international organisation to submit itself to an accountability mechanism. 
Th is being said, recent years have seen an evolution in international and national 
case-law grounded on the human rights principle of access to courts to waive 
 immunity and off er  individuals a mechanism to challenge acts of international 
organisations.50 In the parallel cases  Waite and Kennedy v Germany (1999) and 
 Beer and Regan v Germany (1999), the European Court of Human Rights ruled 
that  immunity of jurisdiction of international organisations was permissible 
insofar as ‘the applicants had available to them reasonable alternative means to 
47 F. Naert, Chapter 5.
48 ILC, Report of the sixty-fi rst session, 4 May to 5 June and 6 July to 7 August 2009, UN Doc. 
A/64/10, p. 38. See the text corresponding to footnote 14.
49 A. Reinisch, International Organisations before National Courts (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 2000). For certain international organisations, constitutive documents 
provide for a limited immunity, as for instance Article VII (3) of the IBRD Articles of 
Agreement: ‘Actions may be brought against the Bank only in a court of competent 
jurisdiction in the territories of a member in which the Bank has an offi  ce, has appointed an 
agent for the purpose of accepting service or notice of process, or has issued or guaranteed 
securities. No actions shall, however, be brought by members or persons acting for or deriving 
claims from members. Th e property and assets of the Bank shall, wheresoever located and by 
whomsoever held, be immune from all forms of seizure, attachment or execution before the 
delivery of fi nal judgment against the Bank.’
50 See for instance Brussels Labour Court of Appeals, Belgium,  Siedler v. Western European 
Union, 17 September 2003, Journal des Tribunaux (2004) p. 617; Case Note by E. David, 
‘L’immunité de juridiction des organisations internationales’, Journal des Tribunaux (2004) 
p. 619; Cour de Cassation (soc.), France, African Development Bank v.  Haas, 25 January 2005, 
Journal des Tribunaux (2005) p. 454; Case Note by E. David, ‘Observations’, Journal des 
Tribunaux (2005) p. 454; A. Reinisch, ‘Th e Immunity of International Organizations and the 
Jurisdiction of their Administrative Tribunals’, 7 Chinese Journal of International Law (2008) 
pp. 285–306; P. Sands and P. Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions, 6th edn. 
(London, Sweet & Maxell 2009) p. 498.
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protect eff ectively their rights under the Convention’.51 While this case-law 
attempts to reconcile individual rights with the rights of the organisation, it also 
raises fundamental questions on the role of  national courts. It requires  national 
courts to assess the complaint mechanisms established by the international 
organisations. Th e question is whether  national courts have the required 
expertise to decide on such cases and whether they constitute an appropriate 
forum to assess the specifi cities of the  dispute settlement mechanisms set up by 
international organisations. Moreover, the rejection of  immunity by  national 
courts may open the door to divided decisions of the courts of diff erent Member 
States of international organisations and lead to uncertainty and tensions.52 
Furthermore, interference by the national judiciary may threaten the 
 independence of an international organisation in the discharge of its mission.53 
Finally, even in the case of a victim obtaining a judgment convicting an 
international organisation, the question arises how this person can enforce the 
national decision.
Th ese legal issues have direct and concrete implications for victims. In 2007, a 
group called the ‘Mothers of  Srebrenica’ asked a Dutch court – Th e Hague 
District Court – to indict the UN for its failure to prevent the  Srebrenica 
massacre and asked for fi nancial compensation. In July 2008, the court ruled 
that it had no jurisdiction as the UN enjoys full  immunity from actions by 
 national courts.54 Th is decision was upheld on 30 March 2010 by the Court of 
Appeal in Th e Hague. Th e Court of Appeal considered that because of the UN’s 
‘special position’ in providing  peacekeeping and ensuring peace and security 
around the world, ‘it is very important that the UN has the broadest  immunity 
possible allowing for as little discussion as possible’ in order to permit the UN to 
undertake its duties.55 Th e ‘Mothers of  Srebrenica’ had also requested the Court 
51 ECtHR,  Beer and Regan v. Germany, Application No. 28934/95, 33 EHHR (2001) p. 3; ECtHR, 
 Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, Application No. 26083/94, 30 EHHR (1999) p. 261.
52 Th e D.C. Court of Appeals noted in  Broadbent v. Organization of American States (1980) that 
‘[a]n attempt by the courts of one nation to adjudicate the personnel claims of international 
civil servants would entangle those courts in the internal administration of those 
organizations. Denial of immunity opens the door to divided decisions of the courts of 
diff erent member states passing judgment on the rules, regulations, and decisions of the 
international bodies. Undercutting uniformity in the application of staff  rules or regulations 
would undermine the ability of the organization to function eff ectively.’ Marvin R.  Broadbent 
et al. v. Organization of American States et al., US Court of Appeals, DC Cir, 8 January 1980, 
628 F.2d 27, 30–35 (DC Cir 1980).
53 F. Mégret, ‘Th e Vicarious Responsibility of the United Nations for “Unintended Consequences 
of Peace Operations”’, in C. Aoi, C. de Cooning and R. Th akur, eds., Th e ‘Unintended’ 
Consequences of Peace Operations (Tokyo, United Nations University Press 2007).
54 District Court in Th e Hague, Th e Netherlands, Th e Association of Citizens Mothers of 
Srebrenica v. Th e Netherlands and the UN (Incidental Proceedings),  295247/HA ZA 07–2973, 
10 July 2008.
55 Court of Appeal in Th e Hague, Th e Netherlands, Th e Association of Citizens Mothers of 
Srebrenica v. Th e Netherlands and the UN (Appeal), 200.022.151/01, 30 March 2010.
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of Appeal to submit the question whether the UN enjoys absolute  immunity or 
not to the European Court of Justice. Th ey argued that fundamental human 
rights enshrined in the legal order of the  European Union were threatened by 
this  immunity. Th is request was rejected by the Court of Appeal. As to the 
argument on their right of access to courts raised by the plaintiff s, the Court of 
Appeal held that this right is not limited by the  immunity of jurisdiction of the 
UN since the victims can sue the perpetrators of the genocide and the State. 
 Srebrenica survivors and victims’ families used the latter possibility in the past 
and fi led a claim for compensation against the Dutch government, arguing that 
Dutch troops failed to take eff ective action to prevent the massacre. Yet, on 
10 September 2008, the Hague District Court rejected the claim for compensation 
and ruled that the Dutch government could not be held responsible since the 
Dutch battalion was under UN command. Consequently, the Dutch State had 
transferred its powers in the area of security and freedom to the UN and could 
not be held liable for any violation committed during UN operations.56 As a 
follow-up to the decision of 30 March 2010 by the Court of Appeal in Th e Hague, 
lawyers for the families have declared that they may bring the case to the Dutch 
Supreme Court and once again request that the question be submitted to the 
European Court of Justice.57
D. THE NEED TO CREATE MECHANISMS TO ENSURE 
ACCOUNTABILITY
Th is example illustrates the urgent need to create mechanisms to ensure 
accountability of international organisations. Various mechanisms may be 
envisaged.58 Some have already been established, such as the Inspection Panel at 
the  World Bank59, or the European Ombudsman60, who deals with complaints 
from citizens about maladministration by EU institutions. Certain mechanisms 
have been established by the UN, such as specifi c procedures for third-party 
claims with a private law character in peace support operations. Most of these 
56 District Court in Th e Hague, Th e Netherlands, Individual Claimants v. Th e Netherlands, 
 265618/HA ZA 06–1672, 10 September 2008.
57 Law Firm Van Diepen Van der Kroef, Press Release, ‘Issue of UN immunity surprisingly not 
submitted to European Court of Justice by Court of Appeals in Th e Hague’, 30 April 2010, 
available at www.vandiepen.com/upload/fi le/srebrenica/srebrenica-press-20100330.pdf.
58 See for instance S. Kuyama and M.R. Fowler, eds., Envisioning Reform. Enhancing UN 
Accountability in the Twenty-First Century (New York, United Nations University Press 
2009).
59 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Development 
Association, Resolution No. IBRD 93–10, Resolution No. IDA 93–6, ‘Th e World Bank 
Inspection Panel’, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/
Resources/ResolutionMarch2005.pdf.
60 Article 228 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
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claims were settled by a local claims review board composed of UN offi  cials and 
specifi cally established for a  peacekeeping mission.61 Another important 
example of internal mechanisms set up by the UN are the UN Dispute Tribunal 
and the UN Appeals Tribunal62, which replaced the UN  Administrative 
Tribunal as of 31 December 2009.63 Th ey have jurisdiction to adjudicate 
applications alleging non-observance of contracts of  employment of  staff  
members of the UN Secretariat or of their terms of appointment. Similar to the 
UN, the  European Union has set up a  European Union Civil Service Tribunal to 
deal with  staff  disputes.64 Th ese mechanisms constitute very elaborate examples 
of an internal justice system established by international organisations. Other 
mechanisms remain at the level of theoretical suggestions, such as the creation 
of an independent human rights court or panel.65 It is noticeable that each of 
these mechanisms is specifi cally established to ensure the accountability of one 
single international organisation. One may be tempted to imagine a general 
mechanism to ensure accountability, applicable to all international organisations 
that accept its  competence, such as the establishment by the UN Human Rights 
Council of a working group with the  mandate of receiving complaints about the 
eff ects on the human rights situation of intergovernmental organisations’ 
operations.66 However, will the specifi city of each international organisation not 
run counter to the establishment of a general system? Would tailor-made 
instruments corresponding to the specifi c mission and nature of the 
international organisation concerned not be preferable in order to optimise 
accountability?
61 UN Secretary-General Report, ‘Financing of the United Nations Protection Force, the United 
Nations Confi dence Restoration Operation in Croatia, the United Nations Preventive 
Deployment Force and the United Nations Peace Forces headquarters Administrative and 
budgetary aspects of the fi nancing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations: fi nancing 
of the United Nations peacekeeping operations’, UN Doc. A/51/389 (1996) paras. 20–33; UN 
Secretary-General Report, Administrative and budgetary aspects of the fi nancing of the 
United Nations peacekeeping operations’, UN Doc. A/51/903 (1997) paras. 7–11; K. 
Schmalenbach, Die Haft ung Internationaler Organisationen im Rahmen von friedenssichernden 
Maßnahmen und Territorialverwaltungen (Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang 2004).
62 UN General Assembly, ‘Administration of justice at the United Nations’, A/Res/62/228, 
6 February 2008.
63 UN Secretary-General, ‘Transitional measures related to the introduction of the new system 
of administration of justice – Secretary-General Bulletin’, SGB/2009/11, 24 June 2009.
64 Decision 2004/752/EC, Euratom of the Council of 2 November 2004 establishing the 
European Union Civil Service Tribunal, OJ L 333/7, 9 November 2004.
65 T. Hammarberg, loc. cit. n. 7.
66 Cf. the proposal of S.I. Skogly, op. cit. n. 35 at p. 188.
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IV. STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK
A. GENERAL CONCEPTS
Th e fi rst part of the book focuses on a number of general concepts and 
fundamental problems. Th is pertains in the fi rst place to the notion of 
‘accountability’. Th is book’s title uses the term ‘accountability’, and not ‘liability’ 
or ‘responsibility’, for human rights violations of international organisations. Ige 
F. Dekker analyses these diff erent concepts in his contribution and critically 
assesses the work of the International Law Commission on this topic.
Even though many international organisations have an international  legal 
personality which is to be distinguished from their Member States, Niels M. 
Blokker examines whether international organisations are really independent 
actors and whether such  independence corresponds to a functional necessity.
Th e question arises whether there remains also a form of responsibility for the 
Member States of the organisation. Th e interrelation between international 
organisations and their Member States is addressed by Olivier De Schutter, who 
suggests a logic of sliding scales in the law of international responsibility: ‘the 
more the organisation itself complies with human rights, and establishes 
mechanisms, whether internal or external, relying either on international 
monitoring bodies or on  national courts, in order to ensure such compliance, the 
less there will be reasons to suspect that, by transferring powers to the 
organisation, the Member States have somehow ‘circumvented’ their human 
rights obligations.’67
Frederik Naert discusses two aspects of the responsibility of Member States in 
the context of international organisations. In a fi rst part, he analyses whether 
international organisations are bound by treaties binding their Member States, 
because that might be one way of ensuring that Member States do not evade their 
obligations when they act through international organisations. Th e second part 
of Frederik Naert’s contribution refl ects on the responsibility of Member States 
for their own actions in the framework of international organisations. Matteo 
Tondini describes the possibility of suing before national and international 
judicial/supervisory bodies States that belong to international organisations.68
67 O. De Schutter, at p. 128.
68 See also C.F. Amerasinghe, ‘Liability to Th ird Parties of Member States of International 
organizations: Practice, Principle and Judicial Precedent’, 85(2) American Journal of 
International Law (1991) p. 275; A. Reinisch, op. cit. n. 49.
Jan Wouters, Eva Brems, Stefaan Smis and Pierre Schmitt
16 Intersentia
B. PEACE AND HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS
Th e risk of violations of human rights by international organisations is especially 
high when they exercise direct operational command and/or power, such as in 
the case of  peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.69 Th is is the focus of the 
second part of the book. As explained by Ulf Häußler in his contribution on 
accountability for possible human rights violations by international organisations 
in the course of peace missions, ‘[t]oday’s peace missions diff er considerably 
from classical Blue Helmet  peacekeeping (…) many of these peace missions have 
become increasingly embedded in receiving states’ power balances, and some are 
expected to remain in that position for signifi cant periods.’70 Peter R. Baehr 
focuses his analysis on the accountability of the United Nations in the case of 
 Srebrenica, while Kristin Bergtora Sandvik investigates the role of procedural 
accountability in the organisation of humanitarian projects, especially on  refugee 
resettlement. She postulates notably that ‘[a]ccountability measures are 
 governance tools with complex eff ects. Devised as means to achieve greater 
 legitimacy for bureaucratic interventions – by way of installing institutional 
cultures of human rights and administrative justice – these measures may 
themselves be transformed into instrumental ends through everyday practice.’71
C. INTERNATIONAL CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
Furthermore, one notices a signifi cant expansion of the traditional  peacekeeping 
missions, which have evolved toward complex operations and have even 
sometimes been entrusted with  international territorial administration.72 In the 
third part of this book, the analysis of the accountability for human rights 
violations of international organisations concentrates on such cases of 
 international territorial administration. Ralph Wilde focuses on the normative 
identity of the UN and explains the general denial of the  legitimacy of 
international  trusteeship as a way of understanding why the accountability 
69 F. Mégret and F. Hoff mann, ‘Th e United Nations as Human Rights Violator? Some Refl ections 
on the United Nations Changing Human Rights Responsibilities’, 25 Human Rights Quarterly 
(2003) pp. 314–342; A. Faite, J. and L. Grenier, eds., Expert Meeting on Multinational Peace 
Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights 
Law to UN Mandated Forces, 80 Geneva, ICRC, October 2004; N.D. White and D. Klaasen, 
eds., op. cit. n. 31; M. Zwanenburg, Accountability of Peace Support Operations (Leiden/
Boston, Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers 2005); H. Langholtz, B. Kondoch and A. Wells, eds., 10 
International Peacekeeping: Th e Yearbook of International Peace Operations (2006).
70 U. Häußler, at p. 215.
71 K. Sandvik, at p. 289.
72 H. Krieger, Th e Kosovo Confl ict and International Law: An Analytical Documentation 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2001); R. Kolb, G. Porretto and S. Vité, L’application 
du droit international humanitaire et des droits de l’homme aux organisations internationales: 
forces de paix et administrations civiles transitoires (Brussels, Bruylant 2005).
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structures operating in relation to  international territorial administration have 
been inadequate. Eric De Brabandere examines the issues of  international 
territorial administration and accountability in concentrating on the UN 
Transitional Authority in East Timor, while Remzije Istrefi  analyses the case of 
the UN Mission in Kosovo.73 In the latter case, the United Nations Interim 
Administration ( UNMIK) has set up a non-judicial mechanism to address 
human rights abuses by the surrogate State ( UNMIK), namely the Ombudsperson 
Institution. Gjylbehare Bella Murati addresses the role of the Ombudsperson in 
Kosovo, focusing in particular on the analysis of violations concerning the right 
to property, the right to liberty and security of an individual and the right to 
freedom of expression.
D. ECONOMIC  GOVERNANCE
Rather than being directly and operationally involved, many international 
organisations operate mainly through policies in the areas of their specifi c 
mission, from development fi nancing to the promotion of culture, health, justice, 
labour standards, monetary stability or trade. Th at is what the fourth part of the 
book focuses on. Th e organisations’ particular focus on their own specialised 
mission may bring them to inadvertently or even consciously neglect or prejudice 
human rights protection in specifi c areas. Especially in the realms of international 
economic  governance such policies have attracted increasing attention in terms 
of their human rights implications. Th roughout the years human rights problems 
arising from the policies of the Bretton Woods institutions, i.e. the  International 
Monetary Fund and the  World Bank Group have received considerable academic 
attention.74 Rekha Oleschak-Pilai’s contribution analyses the  World Bank’s 
Inspection Panel, while Pierre Schmitt focuses on the  International Monetary 
Fund’s accountability for human rights violations. Moreover, the other pillar of 
the international economic order – the  World Trade Organization ( WTO) – 
off ers an intriguing example of the complexities of the relationship between an 
international organisation and its Members as far as the responsibility for 
respecting human rights is concerned.  WTO Members are in an awkward 
position as  WTO rules and disciplines are legally binding upon them and oblige 
them to implement such rules and disciplines in their national policies and legal 
systems, thereby oft en compelling them to prioritise trade over other societal 
values, including certain human rights. Jeroen Denkers and Nicola Jägers ask 
73 See also J. Cerone, ‘Minding the gap: outlining KFOR accountability in post-confl ict Kosovo’, 
12 European Journal of International Law (2001) pp. 469–488; E. Abraham, ‘Th e Sins of the 
Saviour: Holding the United Nations Accountable to International Human Rights Standards 
for Executive Order Detentions in its Mission in Kosovo’, 52(5) American University Law 
Review (2003) p. 1291.
74 See the references mentioned supra n. 35.
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whether the  WTO forms an obstacle to enforcing human rights obligations. 
Stefaan Smis, Stephen Sevidzem Kingah and Christine Janssens focus on the 
relationship between one particular  WTO agreement, the TRIPs Agreement 
(trade-related aspects of  intellectual property rights), and human rights, notably 
the issue of access to cheaper AIDS medicines. Th e authors fi nd that, although 
international trade can enhance human rights in some situations, the TRIPs 
Agreement has a negative impact on the right of access to cheaper HIV/AIDS 
medicines.  Intellectual property and the  right to health need not be friends or 
foes and a proper balance may be found. Finally, Gauthier de Beco analyses the 
possibility of using human rights indicators to improve the accountability of 
development agencies for their human rights obligations.
E.  STAFF OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
Last but not least, the book’s fi ft h part concerns human rights related problems 
aff ecting the  staff  of international organisations. In the  employment relationship 
with their own  staff , international organisations are in a position of direct 
authority in which infringements of human rights can take place. In 2003, some 
110 000 to 130 000 people were working as international public servants.75 
Chittharanjan Felix Amerasinghe examines the accountability of international 
organisations for violations of the human rights of  staff , with an emphasis on the 
recourse to judicial machinery for  staff . Sarah Hunt focuses her analysis on the 
UN and the diffi  culties faced by litigants within the UN  internal legal system. 
Osmat Azzam Jeff erson analyses how  workplace  equality is understood, applied, 
and valued through practice in international organisations. She evaluates why 
such  equality is an illusory concept and notes that it is in the international 
organisations’ best interest to ‘redesign and implement eff ective  equality-based 
rules and to examine rules-based  governance structures.’ As a distinguished 
international legal practitioner, Edward Kwakwa examines human rights 
obligations of international organisations in general and as applied to  staff  
relations in particular from an international organisation’s point of view, namely 
the World  Intellectual Property Organization.
75 H.G. Schermers and N.M. Blokker, International Institutional Law. Unity within Diversity, 4th 
ed. (Boston/Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers 2003) para. 496.
